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 NOTE 
Instilling Hope: Suggested Legislative 
Reform for Missouri Regarding Juvenile 
Sentencing Pursuant to Supreme Court 
Decisions in Miller and Montgomery 
Brooke Wheelwright* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hope is the significant factor distinguishing a life without parole sentence 
(“LWOP”) from other sentences.  In deciding Graham v. Florida, Miller v. 
Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has introduced the concept of hope into Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence, as “[i]t is now impermissible to abandon all hope for a young offender 
and judge him irredeemable at the outset of his sentence.”1  Offenders now 
view “the Eighth Amendment[’s] prohibition on cruel[ and unusual punish-
ments as] . . . ground[s] for hope of eventual release.”2  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court held in Graham that it was unconstitutional to sentence non-homicide 
juvenile offenders to LWOP.3  This decision marked the first appearance of 
hope in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juvenile offenders serving life 
sentences.  Then, the Supreme Court held in Miller that it was a violation of 
the Constitution to impose mandatory LWOP sentences, and that a sentencer 
must take into account an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before 
imposing a penalty of LWOP.4  The Court in Miller stated that the “appropriate 
occasion[] for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be un-
common.”5  While this decision did not guarantee the hope of release for juve-
niles with LWOP sentences, it made the possibility of release much more real.  
And finally, in January 2016, the Court decided in Montgomery that the Miller 
rule is to apply retroactively to all offenders currently serving mandatory 
 
* B.A., Coe College, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2017; Associate Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I would like to 
especially thank Associate Dean Paul Litton, as well as the Missouri Law Review staff, 
for their guidance and support in writing this Note. 
 1. Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. 
Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 1060 (quoting Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 
23 FED. SENT. REP. 27, 76 (2010)). 
 3. See generally Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–66 (2010). 
 4. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457–58, 2471 (2012). 
 5. Id. at 2469. 
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LWOP sentences, giving offenders sentenced before the Miller decision hope 
as well.6 
In fewer than ten years, the Supreme Court has given hope to juveniles 
with LWOP sentences across the country.  However, the introduction of hope 
into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has created complications for many 
states.  When it was decided in 2012, the holding in Miller invalidated sen-
tences for juvenile first degree murder offenders in over twenty states; and 
when Montgomery was decided in 2016, it created the need for even more ju-
venile sentencing reform across the country. 
Missouri recently passed Senate Bill 590 (“SB 590”) in response to these 
decisions.7  However, inadequate time, research, and consideration were given 
to the passage of SB 590, in part because it was rushed through the legislature 
near the end of the legislative session.  As a result, the bill has many shortcom-
ings that must be fixed; this is the primary focus of this Note.  Part II of this 
Note examines the necessary context and background of a handful of Supreme 
Court decisions pertaining to this issue.  Part III discusses the language and 
likely impact of SB 590.  Part III analyzes the issue presented by the Miller 
decision, highlights how Missouri has failed to adequately address this issue, 
assesses what other states have done, and suggests what Missouri should do to 
remedy the shortcomings of SB 590.  Part IV discusses the issue of retroactivity 
presented by the Montgomery decision and offers a suggestion as to what leg-
islative reform Missouri should undertake to accommodate the Montgomery 
decision.  Part V concludes this Note. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND: LEGAL PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM 
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court based Miller on two principles reflected in prior cases 
interpreting constitutional issues surrounding juvenile sentencing.  The first 
principle is that children are different from adults because they do not have the 
equal ability to think, weigh consequences, or resist peer pressure, and, there-
fore, they are less deserving of harsh punishment.8  The second principle is that 
mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional.9  Understanding the cases that 
develop these principles will provide clarity to the Court’s decision in Miller, 
a case that has created an issue Missouri must face – the “Miller Issue,” as 
referred to in this Note.  Missouri is also faced with the “Montgomery Issue,” 
a product of the Court’s holding in Montgomery that Miller applies retroac-
tively.  To understand the “Montgomery issue,” one must start with the Miller 
issue. 
 
 6. See generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 7. S. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 8. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 9. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976); Sumner v. Shuman, 
483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987). 
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A.  Principle #1: Juveniles Are Different from Adults and, Therefore, 
Less Deserving of Harsh Punishment 
Since the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has consistently supported the notion that juveniles are developmentally differ-
ent from adults and, therefore, should be treated differently by the justice sys-
tem. 
In 1988, the Supreme Court held in Thompson that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the execution of a person under sixteen years of age at the time 
he or she committed the underlying offense.10  In 2005, the Supreme Court in 
Roper v. Simmons banned the death penalty for all juveniles when it raised the 
bar against the death penalty from sixteen to eighteen.11  In 2009, the Court 
used this same reasoning in Graham v. Florida to prohibit the imposition of 
LWOP for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.12  The Court found 
that LWOP for non-homicide juvenile offenders was always disproportionate 
in light of their capacity for change and limited moral culpability.13 
B.  Principle #2: Mandatory Death Sentences Are Unconstitutional  
Since 1976, the Court has consistently held that it is a violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to sentence an individual to death without 
giving the individual the right to present mitigating evidence, such as the indi-
vidual’s age, character, background, and upbringing, to prove that a lesser sen-
tence is warranted.14  The Court first faced this issue in Woodson v. North Car-
olina.15  In Woodson, the Court held that North Carolina’s mandatory death 
sentence for first degree murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because a mandatory death sentence failed to mitigate against “arbitrary 
and wanton jury discretion.”16  The Court further explained that not considering 
an offender’s character and the circumstances of the particular offender’s crime 
was inconsistent with “the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the 
Eighth Amendment.”17 
In 1987, the Court decided Sumner v. Shuman.18  In Sumner, the defend-
ant, who was already serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, 
was convicted of murdering a fellow prisoner.19  The defendant was sentenced 
to death pursuant to a Nevada statute that imposed a mandatory death sentence 
 
 10. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. 
 11. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 12. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
 13. Id. at 74. 
 14. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303–05. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 303. 
 17. Id. at 304. 
 18. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). 
 19. Id. at 67. 
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on defendants convicted of murder while already serving an LWOP sentence.20  
The Court concluded that the individualized capital-sentencing doctrine re-
quires the sentencing authority to consider, as a mitigating factor, any aspect 
of the defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense.21 
Combined, these cases established the principle that mandatory death 
penalty sentences are unconstitutional. 
C.  Application of Legal Principles: Subsequent Supreme Court Juris-
prudence 
The previous two sections discussed two important principles set out by 
the Supreme Court: under Thompson, Roper, and Graham, the Court has re-
peatedly upheld the notion that juveniles are different and, therefore, less de-
serving of harsh punishment; under Woodson and Sumner, the Court consist-
ently held that mandatory sentences for the death penalty are unconstitutional.  
In 2012, the Court used these two principles to reach its decision in Miller v. 
Alabama.22  Relatedly, the Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana held 
that the rule in Miller is to apply retroactively.23 
1.  Miller v. Alabama 
Evan Miller was fourteen years old when he murdered his neighbor.24  
The trial court held that, due to Miller’s “mental maturity” and his prior of-
fenses, he should be tried as an adult.25  Miller was found guilty of felony mur-
der for committing murder in the course of arson.26  Felony murder carries a 
mandatory minimum punishment of life without parole, and Miller was sen-
tenced accordingly.27  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, stat-
ing that mandatory LWOP was “not overly harsh when compared to the 
crime.”28  The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review, but the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted review in 2012.29 
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment for-
bids a mandatory sentencing scheme that requires LWOP for juveniles con-
victed of murder.30  Many states – such as Missouri – only have two possible 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 75–76. 
 22. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 23. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 24. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462. 
 25. Id. at 2462–63. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2463. 
 28. Id. at 2457. 
 29. Id. at 2463. 
 30. Id. at 2457–58. 
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punishments for first degree murder, the death penalty or LWOP.  Since juve-
niles cannot receive the death penalty (per Roper), they are automatically sen-
tenced to LWOP if convicted of first degree murder.  In coming to this conclu-
sion, the Court explained that there are two lines of precedent leading to the 
present conclusion that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.31 
The first line of cases32 supports the proposition that juveniles must be 
treated differently under the Constitution.33  Collectively, these cases banned 
categorical sentencing practices that mismatch the culpability of the offenders 
and the severity of the penalty those offenders receive.  The second line of 
cases represents the proposition that no one may be sentenced to death without 
the right to present mitigating evidence, such as information about the defend-
ant’s age, character, background, and upbringing, to prove that a lesser sen-
tence is warranted.34  Although Woodson and its progeny refer to the death 
penalty, the Court relied on the conclusion reached in Graham to apply the 
same arguments to the sentence of LWOP to juveniles.35  In Graham, the Court 
“likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself,” and the 
Court in Miller concluded a sentencing court must consider the juvenile de-
fendant’s individual characteristics before issuing “a state’s harshest pen-
alt[y].” 36 
Based on these two strands of cases, the Miller Court concluded that a 
sentencer must take into account an offender’s youth and attendant character-
istics before imposing a penalty of LWOP.37  The Miller Court explained that 
the characteristics of youth can weaken rationales for punishment, and the con-
sideration of these youth-specific characteristics can render an LWOP sentence 
disproportionate.38  Because of this, Miller permits a juvenile to receive an 
LWOP sentence only after having the right to present mitigating evidence.39  
 31. Id. at 2463. 
 32. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 33. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (holding Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of a person under sixteen years of age at the time he or she committed the under-
lying offense); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (holding it is unconstitutional for juveniles to 
receive the death penalty); Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67 (holding it is unconstitutional 
for juveniles to receive LWOP for non-homicide crimes). 
 34. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301, 303–04 (1976) (holding that 
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder violated Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and that imposition of mandatory death sentence without consideration 
of the character and record of individual offender was unconstitutional under Eighth 
Amendment); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77–78 (1987) (imposing mandatory 
death penalty for prison inmate who was convicted of murder while serving LWOP 
violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 35. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458. 
 36. Id. at 2463. 
 37. Id. at 2467. 
 38. Id. at 2465–66. 
 39. Id. at 2475. 
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2.  Montgomery v. Louisiana 
The Court’s holding in Miller left one very important question unan-
swered: what about the juveniles who received mandatory LWOP sentences 
prior to the Miller decision?  Until Montgomery was decided in 2016, the an-
swer to this question was left up to the states.  The states dealt with the issue 
of the retroactive application of Miller in a variety of ways.  For instance, six-
teen states had the issue decided by their state supreme courts.  Ten of those 
states held that Miller should apply retroactively,40 and six held that it should 
 
 40. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“[Miller’s] procedural 
rule for a hearing is the result of a substantive change in the law that prohibits manda-
tory life-without-parole sentencing.  Thus, the case bars states from imposing a certain 
type of punishment on certain people.”); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 
2013) (stating that Miller is substantive because it “explicitly foreclosed imposition of 
a mandatory sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders”); Diatchenko v. Dist. 
Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013) (finding Miller retroactive 
because it “forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment – mandatory 
life in prison without the possibility of parole – on a specific class of defendants” and 
because the Supreme Court retroactively applied Miller in Jackson); State v. Mantich, 
842 N.W.2d 716, 730 (Neb. 2014) (“In essence, Miller ‘amounts to something close to 
a de facto substantive holding,’ because it sets forth the general rule that life imprison-
ment without parole should not be imposed upon a juvenile except in the rarest of cases 
where that juvenile cannot be distinguished from an adult based on diminished capacity 
or culpability.” (footnote omitted) (quoting The Supreme Court, 2011 Term – Leading 
Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 276, 286 (2012))); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659, 667–68 
(N.H. 2014) (“By prohibiting the imposition of mandatory sentences and requiring that 
the sentencing authority ‘have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances be-
fore imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,’ . . . Miller changed the per-
missible punishment for juveniles convicted of homicide.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475)); Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2014) (“We conclude that [the Miller rule] is a ‘new substantive rule’ that puts a juve-
nile’s mandatory ‘life without parole’ sentence outside the ambit of the State’s 
power.”); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 507 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that while Miller 
“certainly has a procedural component,” it is a substantive rule because it “has effected 
a substantive change in the sentencing statutes applicable to juvenile offenders”); Peo-
ple v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (stating that Miller is substantive because it 
“places a particular class of persons covered by the statute – juveniles – constitutionally 
beyond the State’s power to punish with a particular category of punishment – manda-
tory sentences of natural life without parole”); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 
(S.C. 2014) (holding that “[t]he [Miller] rule plainly excludes a certain class of defend-
ants – juveniles – from specific punishment – life without parole absent individualized 
considerations of youth”); Kelley v. Gordon, 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Ark. 2015) (holding 
that Miller applies retroactively as a matter of “fundamental fairness and evenhanded 
justice,” and the defendant is entitled to a “sentencing proceeding at which he will have 
the opportunity to present Miller evidence”); Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 962 (Fla. 
2015) (holding that the rule in Miller is substantive and to be applied retroactively be-
cause it is a “development of fundamental significance” (quoting Witt v. State, 387 So. 
2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980))). 
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not.41  Five states42 determined the issue by legislation, four of which chose to 
apply Miller retroactively.43 
Consider Henry Montgomery.  In 1963, when Montgomery was seven-
teen years old, he was charged with and subsequently convicted of murdering 
a police officer in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.44  Montgomery was originally 
sentenced to death, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed his conviction 
after finding that public prejudice had prevented Montgomery from receiving 
a fair trial.45  Montgomery was retried and was found “guilty without capital 
 
 41. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013) (Miller is procedural 
because it “does not categorically bar” the sentence of life without parole for juveniles); 
State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 837 (La. 2013) (“[Miller] simply altered the range of 
permissible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life im-
prisonment without parole for such a conviction, ‘mandat[ing] only that a sentence fol-
low a certain process – considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances – 
before imposing a particular penalty.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2471)), abrogated sub nom. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); 
People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is simply the manner 
and factors to be considered in the imposition of that particular sentence that Miller 
dictates, rendering the ruling procedural and not substantive in nature.”), reversed in 
part, 877 N.W.2d 716 (Mich. 2016) (mem.); Ex parte Williams, 183 So. 3d 220, 230–
31 (Ala. 2015) (“Miller did not create a substantive rule requiring retroactive applica-
tion to cases on collateral review; rather, Miller set forth a procedural rule by proscrib-
ing the permissible methods by which states may exercise their continuing power to 
punish juvenile defendants . . . .”), vacated sub nom. Williams v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 
1365 (2016); People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 963 (Colo. 2015) (holding that the rule 
announced in Miller is procedural and does not apply retroactively because the Miller 
decision did “not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime. . 
. . Instead [Miller] mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . .” (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471)); Chambers v. State, 831 
N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013) (reasoning that Miller is procedural because it did not 
“eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of release,” but merely mandated that “‘a sentencer follow a certain 
process – considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics – before impos-
ing’ a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole” (quoting Miller, 
132 S. Ct. at 2469)), overruled sub nom. Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 
2016).  See also Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Pro-
portionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 967–68 (2015); Josha Rovner, Slow to 
Act: States Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without Parole, SENT’G 
PROJECT 2 (June 2014), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Re-
sponses_to_Miller.pdf [hereinafter Rovner, Slow to Act]; Michelle Kirby, Juvenile Sen-
tencing Laws and Court Decisions After Miller v. Alabama, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY 
OFF. LEGIS. RES., https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/rpt/2014-R-0108.htm (last visited Feb. 
5, 2017). 
 42. Those states include California, Delaware, Hawaii, North Carolina, and Wash-
ington. 
 43. Those states include California, Delaware, North Carolina, and Washington.  
Rovner, Slow to Act, supra note 41, at 2; Kirby, supra note 41. 
 44. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 
 45. Id. 
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punishment,” a conviction that required the trial court to impose a sentence of 
LWOP.46  Since this sentence was automatic, Montgomery had no opportunity 
to present mitigating evidence, such as his age, limited capacity for foresight, 
self-discipline and judgment, and higher potential for rehabilitation.47 
Fifty years after Montgomery was first taken into custody, the Court de-
cided Miller.48  After the Court issued its decision in Miller, Montgomery 
sought collateral review at age sixty-seven.49  The trial court denied Montgom-
ery’s motion, holding that the rule in Miller does not apply retroactively to 
cases on collateral review.50  The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review and 
relied on its earlier decision in State v. Tate when deciding that Miller does not 
apply retroactively to cases on state collateral review.51  The Supreme Court of 
the United States granted certiorari to decide the issue of “whether Miller 
adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to 
people condemned as juveniles to die in prison.”52 
In January 2016, the Court decided Miller’s prohibition on mandatory 
LWOP for juvenile offenders was a new substantive law.53  Generally speak-
ing, substantive law is law that governs the relationship between people or be-
tween people and the state,54 whereas procedural law sets out the rules followed 
by the court when it hears a case.55  The Court articulated that the rule created 
in Miller was substantive because it rendered mandatory LWOP an unconsti-
tutional penalty for a class of defendants.56  In other words, the Court found the 
 
 46. Id. at 725–26. 
 47. Id. at 726. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Collateral review is a non-appeal proceeding attacking a judgment.  It is re-
ferred to as a collateral case because it is an entirely new case.  See, e.g., Wall v. Kholi, 
562 U.S. 545, 547 (2011) (“We hold that the phrase ‘collateral review’ in § 2244(d)(2) 
means judicial review of a judgment in a proceeding that is not part of direct review.”). 
 50. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. This general definition of “substantive law” is fairly broad and not extremely 
helpful in application.  However, practicing attorneys Jason Zarrow and William 
Millken provide concrete examples of when a rule is substantive: (1) it places primary 
private conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe, (2) it prohibits a certain 
category of punishment for certain classes of defendants because of their status or of-
fense, (3) it narrows the scope of the criminal statute by interpreting its terms, or (4) it 
modifies the elements of the offense for which the individual was convicted or pun-
ished.  Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules 
to Cases on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Ala-
bama, 48 IND. L. REV 931, 984 (2015).  If a new court-created rule fits into one of these 
categories, it will be applied retroactively under the Teague analysis. 
 55. Difference Between Substantive and Procedural Law, 
DIFFERENCEBETWEEN.NET, http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/differ-
ence-between-substantive-and-procedural-law/ (last updated July 28, 2011). 
 56. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. 
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rule in Miller to be substantive because states do not have the power to impose 
categorical sentences that have been deemed unconstitutional.57  The Court de-
termined that “category” or “class of defendants” to be “juvenile offenders 
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”58  After determining 
that the rule set out in Miller was substantive, the Court then applied Teague.59  
Teague requires all substantive rules, state or federal, to apply retroactively.60 
In all, Montgomery held that the rule set out in Miller – that it is uncon-
stitutional for juveniles to receive mandatory LWOP sentences – is to apply 
retroactively to all cases on collateral review.61  In reality, this means that all 
juvenile offenders currently serving LWOP sentences prior to Miller need to 
be resentenced.  The Court provided a non-binding suggestion for the states: 
Giving Miller retroactive effect, moreover, does not require States to 
relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juve-
nile offender received mandatory life without parole.  A State may rem-
edy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be 
considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.62 
The decisions of Miller and Montgomery have had a significant impact 
on juvenile sentencing law across the county.  The next section explores what 
action the State of Missouri has taken as a result of these decisions. 
III.  ACTION TAKEN IN MISSOURI REGARDING MILLER AND 
MONTGOMERY 
Prior to May 2016, when a juvenile offender was convicted of first degree 
murder in Missouri, there was only one sentencing option: life without parole.63  
Missouri’s previous first degree murder statute authorized only a sentence of 
death or LWOP.64  And since juveniles are constitutionally protected from the 
death penalty by Roper, the only possible punishment under the first degree 
murder statute for juvenile offenders was LWOP.65  However, in 2012, the Su-
preme Court held in Miller that a mandatory LWOP sentence was unconstitu-
tional as well.66  Therefore, from 2012 to May of 2016, Missouri’s first degree 
murder statute did not provide a constitutionally valid punishment for juve-
niles.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 734. 
 59. Id. at 736. 
 60. Id. at 728. 
 61. Id. at 727. 
 62. Id. at 736. 
 63. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000) (current version at MO. ANN. STAT. 565.033 
(West 2017)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 66. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
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Miller and Montgomery required Missouri to address two issues: (1) what 
sentence should apply to juveniles convicted of first degree murder post-Miller, 
and (2) how should juveniles sentenced to mandatory LWOP sentences pre-
Miller be resentenced?  In May of 2016, SB 590 addressed these issues.67 
RSMO § 565.033 responds to the first issue by repealing the mandatory 
LWOP sentence and providing that a person who was under eighteen years of 
age at the time of the crime may be sentenced to either (1) LWOP, (2) life with 
the eligibility for parole, or (3) a term of imprisonment between thirty and forty 
years.68  RSMO § 565.033 also provides factors for the sentencer to consider 
when reviewing an offender’s suitability for LWOP.69  These factors include: 
the nature of the circumstances of the offense, the likelihood for rehabilitation, 
the degree of the defendant’s culpability in light of his or her age and role in 
the offense (including intellectual capacity as well as mental and emotional 
health), the offender’s background (including family, home, and community 
environment), plus a handful of others.70 
Relatedly, RSMO § 565.034 establishes specific requirements for when a 
prosecutor intends to seek an LWOP sentence.71  It requires that a juvenile 
found guilty of first degree murder be eligible for a sentence of LWOP “only 
if a unanimous jury, or a judge in a jury-waived sentencing, finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that . . . [t]he victim received physical injuries personally in-
flicted by the defendant and the physical injuries inflicted by the defendant 
caused the death of the victim,” and if at least one of an enumerated list of 
aggravating factors exists.72 
Lastly, RSMO § 558.047 addresses how to resentence juveniles given 
mandatory LWOP sentences pre-Miller.73  RSMO § 558.047 states that any 
person sentenced to LWOP for the crime of first degree murder committed as 
a juvenile prior to August 28, 2016, be eligible for a parole hearing after serving 
twenty-five years.74  Relatedly, RSMO § 558.047 also states that a juvenile 
convicted of first degree murder on or after August 28, 2016, and sentenced to 
any term of imprisonment except LWOP, be eligible for a parole hearing after 
serving twenty-five years and eligible for another parole hearing after serving 
thirty-five years.75 
 
 67. S. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 68. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033 (West 2017). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 565.034. 
 72. Id. § 565.034.6. 
 73. Id. § 558.047. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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IV.  MISSOURI LEGISLATURE GOT IT WRONG: WHAT MISSOURI    
SHOULD HAVE DONE IN RESPONSE TO MILLER AND MONTGOMERY 
SB 590 was pre-filed December 1, 2015.76  However, from January 25, 
2016 (the day Montgomery was decided), until April 5, 2016 (the day the bill 
was amended), the bill, as written, was unconstitutional.77  It required action 
deemed by Montgomery to be unconstitutional.78  The amendment to the bill 
filed on April 5, 2016, attempted to bring the bill in alignment with the holding 
of Montgomery.  Five weeks after the introduction of the amendment, the bill 
became law.  However, during those short five weeks, the bill was changed 
very minimally in regards to its status under Miller and Montgomery.79 
It was undoubtedly a pressing time for the legislature.  A bill needed to 
be passed on this issue because Missouri’s previous first degree murder statute 
did not provide a valid sentencing option for juveniles, and there were eighty-
four juveniles convicted of first degree murder who needed to be resentenced 
pursuant to Montgomery.80  Due to its race against the legislative clock, the 
legislature did not have adequate time to research and engage in a thorough 
consideration to ensure this statute was responsive to the concerns raised by 
Miller and Montgomery. 
The following two sections of this Note are the result of taking the time, 
doing the research, and engaging in the consideration these two issues deserve.  
To follow is a proposed legislative reform of RSMO §§ 558.047, 565.033, and 
565.034. 
A.  The “Miller Problem”: What Should Be the Sentencing Options for 
Juveniles Convicted of First Degree Murder Post-Miller in Missouri? 
Prior to May 2016, the only sentencing option for a juvenile convicted of 
first degree murder was LWOP.81  However, pursuant to Miller, it was uncon-
stitutional to mandatorily sentence juveniles to LWOP, which left Missouri 
without a constitutional sentencing option for a juvenile convicted of first de-
gree murder.82  In response to this problem, RSMO § 565.033 was enacted.  
RSMO § 565.033 requires that juveniles convicted of first degree murder be 
sentenced to one of the following: (1) LWOP, (2) life with the possibility of 
parole, or (3) a term of imprisonment between thirty and forty years.83  RSMO 
§ 565.033 brought Missouri’s juvenile sentencing structure for first degree 
 
 76. S. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000) (amended 2016). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 83. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033 (West 2017). 
11
Wheelwright: Instilling Hope
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
278 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
murder into compliance with the Constitution.84  However, as discussed above, 
the sentencing structure it implemented was created too quickly, and adequate 
consideration was not given to the complex factors surrounding the decision.  
As a result, the following section discusses the legislative reform Missouri 
should undergo in regards to its juvenile sentencing structure. 
1.  Other States’ Responses to Miller 
In determining how Missouri should respond to this issue, it is helpful to 
consider how other states have responded to Miller.  Some have eliminated 
LWOP as a punishment for juveniles, others have made it nearly impossible to 
apply LWOP to juveniles, and in some states, LWOP is still a sentencing option 
for juveniles. 
The Supreme Court in Miller clearly articulated that juvenile offenders 
could not be sentenced to LWOP without considering mitigating factors.85  
This presents two options for states: they can either choose to eliminate LWOP 
as a punishment for juvenile offenders, or they can determine on a case-by-
case basis the culpability of each juvenile offender and determine if he or she 
is, in fact, deserving of the harshest punishment available for juveniles.  Since 
the Miller decision in 2012, twenty-six states have changed their laws for ju-
venile offenders convicted of first degree murder.86  Prior to Miller, all but four 
of these states required LWOP for juveniles convicted of murder.87  Currently, 
eighteen states88 have banned juvenile LWOP.89  Of the thirty-two states that 
allow LWOP sentences for juveniles, four – Pennsylvania, Michigan, Louisi-
ana, and California – account for approximately half of the 2500 juveniles serv-
ing LWOP sentences.90  This section explores the actions of three states that 
have dealt with this issue differently in order to pool a range of information 
that can inform Missouri’s approach. 
In response to Miller, Delaware eliminated LWOP for juvenile offend-
ers.91  Its law replaced the automatic LWOP sentence for first degree murder 
with a sentencing range of twenty-five years to life.92  After serving twenty-
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69. 
 86. Rovner, Slow to Act, supra note 41, at 1. 
 87. Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT 
2 (July 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juve-
nile-Life-Without-Parole.pdf [hereinafter Rovner, Juvenile Life]. 
 88. These states include Oregon, Nevada, Montana, Utah Wyoming, Iowa, Colo-
rado, Kansas, New Mexico, Texas, Kentucky, West Virginia, Connecticut, Vermont, 
Delaware, Massachusetts, Alaska, and Hawaii. 
 89. Rovner, Juvenile Life, supra note 87, at 2. 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. S. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013). 
 92. Id. 
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five years, the juvenile offender can petition the trial court for a sentence re-
view.93  In the sentence review, the court is to determine if the person has been 
rehabilitated and should be eligible for release.94  Additionally, the law states 
that juveniles sentenced to LWOP for first degree murder may petition for a 
reduction in their sentence after serving thirty years.95 
The Miller decision did not invalidate California’s first degree murder 
statute because it provided an option for punishment of LWOP or twenty-five 
years to life, at the discretion of the court.96  However, prior to the 2012 passage 
of SB 9, a legislative response to Miller, California had 309 inmates serving 
LWOP sentences for murders committed when they were minors.97  The 2012 
law will reduce that number significantly.  The law allows inmates convicted 
of murder as juveniles to ask judges to reconsider their sentences after they 
serve at least fifteen years in prison.98  If the judge does not grant leniency, 
another petition may be made after the offender serves twenty years, and then 
another petition may be filed after serving twenty-four years.99  However, of-
fenders whose crimes involved torture or the killing of public officials are fore-
closed from using the reconsideration provisions.100  The bill gives the judge 
the opportunity to reduce the sentence from LWOP to twenty-five years to life 
if the judge determines the inmate has taken steps toward rehabilitation.101 
In 2012, in response to Miller, SB 850 was enacted in Pennsylvania.102  
For first degree murder, judges in Pennsylvania have the option to sentence 
juveniles from fifteen to seventeen years of age to a minimum sentence of 
thirty-five years to life, with LWOP as a discretionary option, and a minimum 
of twenty-five years to life for juvenile offenders under fifteen years of age.103  
The bill also set out additional procedural measures104 the court must follow 
prior to imposing an LWOP sentence.105  This reform leaves Pennsylvania’s 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(a) (West 2017) (imposition of death penalty pro-
hibited for persons under eighteen). 
 97. Michael Harris, California Law Gives Youth Sentenced to Life Without Parole 
Another Chance, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., http://youthlaw.org/publication/califor-
nia-law-gives-youth-sentenced-to-life-without-parole-another-chance/ (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2017). 
 98. S. 9, 2013–2014 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. S. 850, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Lauren Kinell, Note, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States Can 
Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 149 (2013). 
 105. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
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sentencing scheme as one of the harshest in the country.106  Senate Bill 850 
“relaxes automatic LWOP sentence[s] for juveniles somewhat, [but it] is still 
so extreme as to be a virtual guarantee of life sentences for youth offenders.”107 
2.  Suggestions for Missouri 
Based on the discussion of the above-mentioned states, there are numer-
ous ways to handle the requirements of Miller.  The following sections advo-
cate for a reform of the statutes enacted pursuant to SB 590.  This section first 
explains why Missouri should ban LWOP for juvenile offenders, the second 
section suggests the sentencing scheme that Missouri should adopt for these 
offenders, and the third discusses the policy justifications that support these 
proposals. 
i.  Missouri Should Ban LWOP for Juvenile Offenders 
In Miller, the Supreme Court continued to allow LWOP to be a sentencing 
option for some juvenile offenders, but that does not necessarily mean Missouri 
must have this option.108  This Note argues LWOP should be eliminated alto-
gether for juvenile offenders in Missouri.  Categorical bans are not always fa-
vorable.  However, in this instance, a categorical ban on LWOP for juvenile 
offenders is preferable for numerous reasons. 
Generally speaking, an LWOP sentence for a child is inhumane and bar-
baric – a person’s life should not be defined by a tragic mistake he or she made 
as a child.  Taking a closer look at this punishment for this class of offenders, 
none of the justifications for punishment are accomplished when a juvenile is 
sentenced to LWOP, even when other mitigating factors are absent. 
In the United States, criminal punishment serves any combination of the 
following four goals: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion.109  Further, “[t]he effectiveness of any punishment . . . should be measured 
against the yardstick of these four goals and should accord with the widely 
accepted corollary that no punishment should be more severe than necessary to 
 
 106. Matt Fleischer, Governor, Have Mercy: Give Juvenile Justice a Chance in 
Pennsylvania, TAKEPART (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.takepart.com/arti-
cle/2012/10/22/no-mercy-kid-offenders. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
 109. Lisa M. Storm, 1.5 The Purposes of Punishment, FLAT WORLD EDUC., 
http://catalog.flatworldknowledge.com/bookhub/reader/4373?e=storm_1.0-ch01_s05 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/14
2017] INSTILLING HOPE 281 
achieve these stated goals.”110  LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders “fail[] 
to measure up on all counts” and thus are not justified.111 
Retribution goals are met when the criminal sentence is directly related 
to the personal culpability of the offender.112  However, in order to determine 
if the offender “deserves” the punishment he or she is given, the nature of the 
offense, as well as the culpability of the offender, must be considered.113  After 
taking each of these considerations into account, it is clear that children do not 
deserve one of the harshest punishments in our criminal system.114  As dis-
cussed in further detail below, children are not as blameworthy or as culpable 
as adults because children do not have the same ability to think, weigh conse-
quences, or resist peer pressure.115  The Court in Roper stated that “these dif-
ferences [between juveniles and adults] render suspect any conclusion that a 
juvenile falls among the worst offenders.”116 
Deterrence is accomplished when the threat of a punishment dissuades 
someone from committing a certain crime.  Proponents of LWOP sentences for 
juveniles argue that children will be best deterred from committing homicides 
if they face harsh sentences as a consequence of their actions.117  However, 
“research has failed to show that the threat of adult punishment deters adoles-
cents from crime[,] . . . given the well-documented limited abilities of children, 
including teenagers, to anticipate the consequences of their actions and ration-
ally assess their options.”118  Even after decades of research, there has been 
minimal evidence to support the notion that the threat of incarceration does 
much of anything to deter criminals.119  Furthermore, adolescents are less able 
to grasp the significance of an LWOP sentence.  Thus, LWOP sentences for 
juveniles do not accomplish the deterrence goal, either.120 
Incapacitation contributes to public safety because an incarcerated person 
cannot commit additional crimes when he or she is incapacitated.121  However, 
once an offender has been rehabilitated, the justification for incapacitation 
 
 110. The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United 
States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 11, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/re-
port/2005/10/11/rest-their-lives/life-without-parole-child-offenders-united-
states#page. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Storm, supra note 109. 
 113. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). 
 114. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 115. Position Statement 58: Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders, MENTAL 
HEALTH AM., http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/life-without-parole-juve-
niles (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 116. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 117. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 110. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Maggie Koerth-Baker, Crime Despite Punishment, UNDARK (May 16, 
2016), http://undark.org/article/deterrence-punishments-dont-reduce-crime/. 
 120. Position Statement 58, supra note 115. 
 121. Storm, supra note 109. 
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ends, because, at that point, the individual in custody is no longer a threat to 
public safety.122  Oftentimes, juvenile offenders who receive LWOP sentences 
are first-time offenders with “little in their histories to warrant the assumption 
that they would not grow up and be rehabilitated if they were spared a lifetime 
in prison.”123  Additionally, a study conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention found that about 91.5% of the juvenile offenders 
in their study “reported decreased or limited illegal activity during the first 3 
years following their court involvement.”124  Since juvenile offenders have 
high potential to be rehabilitated and become productive members of society, 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are not warranted on incapacitation 
grounds either.125 
The last justification for punishment is rehabilitation.  LWOP sentences 
for juvenile offenders do not serve rehabilitation goals.126  In fact, they do just 
the opposite – LWOP sentences “discourage[] youth offenders from attempting 
to reform themselves in prison.”127  Because correctional facilities typically 
reserve educational, vocational, and other reform programs that develop the 
minds and skills of prisoners for those individuals who will someday be re-
leased, juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP will rarely receive the benefit 
of rehabilitation programs while in prison.128 
In addition to the lack of justification for juvenile LWOP sentences, it is 
important to note that the United States is one of the only nations permitting 
LWOP for juvenile offenders.129  The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
a treaty that forbids LWOP for juvenile offenders, has been ratified by every 
country except the United States and Somalia.130 Excluding the United States, 
there are fewer than fifteen juvenile offenders currently serving LWOP sen-
tences in the world.131 
 
 122. Position Statement 58, supra note 115. 
 123. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 110. 
 124. Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights from Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal 
Study of Serious Adolescent Offenders, DOJ, at 1 (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230971.pdf. 
 125. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 110. 
 126. Juvenile Life Without Parole Fact Sheet, CITIZENS FOR JUV. JUST. (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.cfjj.org/pdf/LWOP%20March%202011.pdf. 
 127. The Rest of Their Lives, supra note 110. 
 128. Juvenile Life Without Parole Fact Sheet, supra note 126. 
 129. James Felman & Cynthia Orr, ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 107C, 
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2015). 
 130. United States: Thousands of Children Sentenced to Life Without Parole, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Oct. 11, 2005, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/10/11/united-
states-thousands-children-sentenced-life-without-parole. 
 131. Id. 
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Furthermore, it is nearly impossible for judges to “define or identify what 
constitutes [] adult level culpability among offending youths.”132  Even “[c]li-
nicians lack tools with which to assess impulsivity, foresight, and preference 
for risk, and any metric with which to equate those qualities with criminal re-
sponsibility.”133  Therefore, it follows that judges are even less equipped to do 
so.134  Due to the inability to define or measure immaturity or equate it to cul-
pability, the juvenile offenders of our society end up being over punished.135  
A categorical rule takes into consideration the inability of judges or juries to 
balance the “abstract idea of youthfulness against the aggravating reality of a 
horrific crime.”136 
When the Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in Roper, it was 
fearful that judges and juries “could not distinguish between a youth’s dimin-
ished responsibility for causing the harm and the harm itself.”  For this reason 
and others, the Court categorically banned the imposition of the death pen-
alty.137  There is nothing to suggest that judges and juries have a better ability 
to make this determination when the punishment in question is LWOP instead 
of the death penalty.138  Additionally, society has accepted the use of age-based 
categories to approximate the age of maturity when it is either impossible or 
inefficient to try to calculate maturity on a case-by-case basis.  Consider activ-
ities such as voting, driving, and consuming alcohol.139 
Likewise, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) supports the abolish-
ment of LWOP for juvenile offenders.140  The ABA has adopted Resolution 
107C, which suggests that courts should eliminate LWOP for juveniles both 
prospectively and retroactively.141  The ABA states that: 
The legal developments in Graham and Miller, along with the advances 
in brain and behavioral development science showing how children are 
fundamentally different from adults, as explained in Roper and in the 
report accompanying ABA Approved Resolution 105C, support a con-
clusion that it is inappropriate to decide at the time of sentencing that 
life without parole is an appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender.  
This resolution [(107C)] encourages jurisdictions to go one step further 
than Miller and to join the policy position of the rest of the world by 
 
 132. Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young 
to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 138 (2013). 
 133. Id. at 139. 
 134. Id. at 140. 
 135. Id. at 142–43. 
 136. Id. at 140–41. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 131 n.114. 
 139. Id. at 140. 
 140. Felman & Orr, supra note 129. 
 141. Id. 
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eliminating mandatory life without parole sentences for youthful of-
fenders.142 
While the Miller Court did not specifically prohibit the imposition of 
LWOP after considering a child’s age, the Court did suggest that “appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be un-
common.”143  After considering the underlying psychological premise of 
Roper, Graham, and Miller, this “suggestion sounds less like dicta” and a lot 
more like a preview of a future decision.144  Based on the above-mentioned 
reasons, a categorical ban on juvenile LWOP is “the approach most likely to 
be taken by the Supreme Court if this question is ever placed before them in 
the future.”145 
Therefore, pursuant to the arguments set out above, and in accordance 
with principles set out by the Supreme Court, Missouri should abolish LWOP 
for juvenile offenders. 
ii.  Suggested Sentencing Options for Juveniles Convicted of First De-
gree Murder in Missouri 
The suggestion in the previous section that Missouri should abolish 
LWOP as a sentencing option for juveniles provides only a partial solution.  
Missouri must also determine what the sentencing option for juvenile first de-
gree murder offenders should be at the present moment.  The suggestion pro-
vided in this section is similar to the sentencing scheme adopted for offenders 
under the age of eighteen in the Model Penal Code.146  Since Missouri has al-
ready adopted much of the Model Penal Code, to enact legislation in accord-
ance with it in regard to juvenile sentencing would not be a far stretch.147 
First, the guidelines when sentencing a juvenile offender need to be es-
tablished.  When sentencing a juvenile first degree murder offender, blame-
worthiness, gravity of the offense, harm to the victim, offender rehabilitation 
and regeneration, deterrence, and incapacitation should all be considered.148  
However, each of these considerations should not be given equal weight.  First, 
in regard to blameworthiness, the offender’s age must be a mitigating factor, 
and greater weight should be given to offenders of younger ages.  However, 
this consideration does not rule out that a court could find a juvenile offender 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 144. Kinell, supra note 104, at 168. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011), http://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-
penal-code-sentencing-tentative-draft-no-2. 
 147. Anders Walker, Criminal Confusion: Addressing the Tension Between Bar 
Preparation & Practical Skills, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 669, 669 (2013). 
 148. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c. 
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committed a crime with a high degree of personal blameworthiness.149  A court 
should find a juvenile offender highly culpable and deserving of a harsher pun-
ishment if the crime was “committed only for a thrill, or for sadistic purposes, 
or out of racial animus.”150 
Second, priority should be given to the punishment justification of reha-
bilitation over justifications such as general deterrence, incapacitation of dan-
gerous offenders, and restoration of crime victims and communities.151  While 
a court may consider deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, gravity 
of the offense, and harm to the victim, these factors are ancillary to the consid-
eration that should be given to the reduced blameworthiness of juveniles and 
the goal of rehabilitation.152  However, if “an offender has been convicted of a 
serious violent offense, and there is a reliable basis for belie[ving] that the of-
fender presents a higher risk of serious violent offending in the future, priority 
may be given to the goal of incapacitation.”153  This will not be a common 
occurrence, as “[m]ost juvenile criminal careers last a very short time.”154  It is 
also important to note that deterrence cannot be the primary sentencing goal of 
a juvenile offender because juvenile offenders are less deterrable due to their 
reduced ability to reason and weigh consequences.155 
Another feature of the proposed new sentencing structure is that there 
must be an increased emphasis on the individual considerations of each case 
and offender.156  Therefore, under the new system, there will be no mandatory 
minimum penalty for juvenile offenders.157  The American Law Institute has 
long disapproved of mandatory minimum penalties for numerous reasons.158  
First, statutorily mandated punishments shift the discretion of sentencing from 
courts, on an individualized basis, to the legislature, on a general basis.159  This 
is problematic because legislatures do not have the ability to know ahead of 
time the specific facts of both the crime and the offender in all the cases a court 
 
 149. Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, 
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 150. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c. 
 151. Courtney Amelung, Endnote, Responding to the Ambiguity of Miller v. Ala-
bama: The Time Has Come for States to Legislate for a Juvenile Restorative Justice 
Sentencing Regime, 72 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 21, 40 (2013). 
 152. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(b). 
 153. Id. § 6.11A(c). 
 154. Id. § 6.11A cmt. c. 
 155. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty, ABA JUV. JUST. 
CTR. 2 (Jan. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/crimi-
nal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 156. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 cmt. a(3). 
 157. Id. § 6.06 cmt. d. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Mandatory Sentencing Was Once America’s Law-and-Order Panacea. Here’s 
Why It’s Not Working, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS 2, http://www.prison-
policy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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will hear.160  Second, “[i]t is inherently unsound to assume that all offenses 
within a given category must necessarily be aggravated to the same high level 
of seriousness, or will be uniformly devoid of mitigating circumstances.”161 
Furthermore, mandatory sentences do nothing to contribute to the goals 
of rehabilitation or reintegration.162  This concern is even more pronounced 
when the offender is under the age of eighteen because of the elevated focus 
on rehabilitation placed on the sentencing of juvenile offenders.163  Due to the 
heightened need for individual considerations and flexibility when sentencing 
juveniles, the proposed system will eliminate mandatory minimum sentences. 
In addition to these general sentencing guidelines, Missouri should im-
plement an age-as-a-proxy-for-culpability model.  Under this model, the larg-
est sentence reductions are given to the youngest offenders.164  This makes 
good sense considering the younger the offender, the more likely he or she is 
to (1) be less culpable, (2) embody the typical immaturities of youth, and (3) 
be capable of change.165  This model is “based on a sliding scale of diminished 
responsibility,”166 which is consistent with the diminished culpability and 
heighted capacity for change considerations in Roper, Graham, and Miller. 
Using the age groups in the Model Penal Code – under fourteen, under 
sixteen, and under eighteen167 – Missouri should implement the following 
scheme: 
1. First degree murder offenders under the age of fourteen shall not 
receive a sentence longer than twenty years; 
2. First degree murder offenders between the ages of fourteen and six-
teen shall not receive a sentence longer than twenty-five years; and 
3. First degree murder offenders between the ages of sixteen and eight-
een shall not receive a sentence longer than thirty years.168 
 
 160. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.06 cmt. d. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Lindsey E. Krause, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Need for a Complete Abo-
lition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Juveniles in Response to Roper, Graham, 
and Miller, 33 LAW & INEQ. 481, 503 (2015). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Feld, supra note 132, at 141. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(g) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 168. Under this sentencing scheme, juvenile offenders between the ages of sixteen 
and eighteen (the group of offenders likely to be the most mature, culpable, and least 
likely to reform) will receive, at a minimum, the equivalent of a life sentence of an 
adult, with the possibility of a longer sentence based on an evaluation of factors that 
will be disused below.  This is a reasonable compromise for taking LWOP off the table. 
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4. Additionally, juvenile first degree murder offenders are continu-
ously eligible for parole review on a bi-yearly basis. 
The parole review option provides juveniles with the incentive to be on 
their best behavior while in prison.169  The bi-yearly review sends juveniles the 
message that it is never too late to change, even if they were not granted relief 
at their first parole hearing.  It also “recognizes that adolescents can generally 
be expected to change more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and 
to a greater absolute degree.”170 
When Missouri courts are making the determination as to how many years 
a juvenile should serve between the maximum and minimum options listed 
above, there are many factors the courts need to consider.  RSMO § 565.033.2 
sets out a list of the factors that Missouri courts should consider when deter-
mining how many years, within the above-proposed maximums and mini-
mums, an offender should serve.171  Those factors include: nature of the cir-
cumstances of the offense; likelihood for rehabilitation; defendant’s back-
ground, including the environment of one’s home, family, and community; de-
gree of the defendant’s culpability in light of his or her age and role in the 
offense (including intellectual capacity as well as mental and emotional 
health); extent of participation in the offense; effect of familial or peer pres-
sures; and prior criminal history.172 
Furthermore, this method tempers the common criticism that some juve-
nile offenders should, in fact, be tried as adults because they have the mental 
capacities of adults.  Proponents of this argue that, for every less culpable ju-
venile offender saved from LWOP by these reforms, there will be a more cul-
pable juvenile offender who will not receive the punishment he or she de-
serves.173  However, this criticism is flawed because even if an individual under 
the age of eighteen has the mental capacities of an adult, individuals under 
eighteen are still developing their personalities, commitments, and outlooks on 
life; further, they are still more susceptible to group pressures.174 
A sentencing method such as this holds juveniles accountable and bal-
ances the risk that these offenders pose to the community while still providing 
them with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”175  Under the proposed 
sentencing scheme, all juveniles will be able to obtain parole at some point in 
their lives, which will hopefully motivate them to reform while they are incar-
cerated. 
 
 169. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A rep. n.a. 
 170. Id. § 6.11A cmt. h. 
 171. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033.2 (West 2017). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Peter A. Weir, Opinion, Some Juvenile Killers Deserve Adult Justice, DENVER 
POST (Nov. 19, 2013, 9:26 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/11/19/some-juve-
nile-killers-deserve-adult-justice/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2016, 1:33 AM). 
 174. Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability and the Adolescent Brain, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 30, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1225. 
 175. Feld, supra note 132, at 135. 
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iii.  Policy Rationale for Banning LWOP and Adopting the Proposed 
Sentencing Scheme 
The elimination of LWOP for juvenile offenders and the proposed sen-
tencing scheme set out above creates noticeably more lenient sentencing stand-
ards than are currently in place in Missouri under RSMO §§ 558.047, 565.033, 
and 565.034.176  This section provides policy considerations for why this dras-
tic change is warranted, supported by current research in psychology and crim-
inology.177 
Studies of brain development from adolescence to adulthood have led to 
various conclusions regarding the blameworthiness of juveniles.178  Research-
ers know that brain tissue, crucial for the insulation of brain circuitry as well 
as its precise and efficient operation, continues to change and grow until a per-
son’s early twenties.179  Studies also reveal that the frontal lobe, responsible 
for reasoning, is not fully developed in adolescents.180  The frontal lobe under-
goes more changes during adolescence than during any other stage of life.181  
Furthermore, the frontal lobe is the last part of the brain to develop.182  This 
“means that even as they become fully capable in other areas, adolescents can-
not reason as well as adults: ‘[m]aturation, particularly in the frontal lobes, has 
been shown to correlate with measures of cognitive functioning.’”183  Dr. Deb-
orah Yurgelun-Todd of Harvard Medical School has concluded that adoles-
cents often rely on the emotional parts of their brain rather than the frontal lobe 
when making decisions.184  She explained that teenagers more often act based 
on a “gut response,” as opposed to evaluating the consequences of what they 
are doing.185  Moreover , during adolescent years, the body undergoes dramatic 
hormonal and emotional changes, and in young boys, specifically, one of those 
hormones is testosterone, which is closely associated with aggression.186  For 
 
 176. See notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
 177. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c(1)–(2) (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 178. Juvenile Life Without Parole Fact Sheet, supra note 126. 
 179. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 155, at 2. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Matu-
ration in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859–60 (1999). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 155, at 2 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density 
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent 
Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8819 (2001)). 
 184. Interview: Deborah Yurgelun-Todd, PBS FRONTLINE (2002), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/teenbrain/interviews/todd.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 155, at 2. 
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all of these reasons, the degree of personal culpability is different for juvenile 
offenders than it is for adult offenders. 
Additionally, “[m]any believe that adolescents are more responsive to re-
habilitative sanctions than adult offenders.  While the evidence for this propo-
sition is mixed, it is clear that some rehabilitative programs are effective for 
some juvenile offenders.”187  A national survey from 2011 conducted by a re-
search firm188 concluded that society thinks it has a greater moral obligation to 
attempt to rehabilitate juvenile offenders, and, furthermore, “that the benefits 
of doubt concerning the efficacy of treatment should normally be resolved in 
favor of offenders under 18.”189 
Studies have also shown that a great majority of juvenile offenders will 
voluntarily desist from criminal activity without intervention from the legal 
system.190  Therefore, the legal system should refrain from incarcerating juve-
niles for long periods of time so as not to disrupt a juvenile’s normal aging 
progression toward desistence.191  Furthermore, a significant minority of juve-
nile offenders commit serious crimes at high rates: “Age-crime curves [provide 
evidence that] peak years of criminal involvement are in the late teens and early 
20s.  [O]nly [about] 6 or 8 percent[] [of juvenile offenders] go on to become 
‘chronic’ or ‘persistent’ offenders who commit outsized numbers of serious 
crimes.”192  Lastly, there is no support for the proposition that increased pun-
ishment severity correlates with more effective deterrence for any age group, 
with the effect on juvenile offenders being especially remote.193  It is highly 
unlikely that juvenile offenders know the law and the serious consequences of 
committing specific crimes.194  Even if they do know, juvenile offenders are 
more likely to be susceptible to peer pressures even when they are aware of the 
consequences.195 
Therefore, due to the decreased blameworthiness, higher potential for re-
habilitation, decreased need for harm prevention, and lack of impact deterrence 
has on juvenile offenders, it is thoroughly justified that Missouri implement 
 
 187. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c(2) (AM. LAW INST., Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 2011). 
 188. GBA Strategies is a company that offers expertise in survey research; its 2011 
survey result found that 89% of Americans strongly favor rehabilitation and treatment 
approaches such as counseling education, treatment, restitution, and community ser-
vice.  See Liz Ryan, Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH 
JUST. 12 (Oct. 2011), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/poli-
cybriefs/policyreform/FR_YACJS_2012.pdf. 
 189. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c(2). 
 190. See Mulvey, supra note 124. 
 191. John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 
28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 17 (2001). 
 192. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. c(4). 
 193. Position Statement 58, supra note 115. 
 194. Five Things About Deterrence, NAT’L INST. JUST. (June 6, 2016), 
http://nij.gov/five-things/pages/deterrence.aspx. 
 195. Mulvey, supra note 124. 
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this more lenient sentencing structure that eliminates LWOP for juvenile of-
fenders and imposes maximum sentences of twenty, twenty-five, and thirty 
years, respectively, based on the offenders’ ages. 
B.  The “Montgomery Problem”: What Should Missouri’s Procedure 
Be for Resentencing Juveniles Who Received Mandatory LWOP Sen-
tences Pre-Miller? 
In January 2016, the Supreme Court decided in Montgomery that Miller’s 
prohibition on mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders announced 
a new substantive rule that, under the Constitution, is retroactive in cases on 
state collateral review.196  Currently in Missouri, RSMO § 558.047 requires 
that a juvenile sentenced to LWOP prior to August 28, 2016, be eligible for 
parole after serving twenty-five years.197  The statute also requires that a juve-
nile sentenced after August 28, 2016, to any term of imprisonment other than 
LWOP, be eligible for a parole hearing after serving twenty-five years.198  
However, as discussed above, this decision was made in fewer than five weeks 
and without much debate or consideration.199 
Resentencing can be done in two different ways, but unfortunately, the 
Montgomery decision provided states with little guidance on which to choose 
in resentencing the 2100 juvenile offenders currently serving mandatory 
LWOP sentences across the country.200  The Court advised: “A State may rem-
edy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be consid-
ered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”201  The court did not write 
“shall” or “must”; it wrote “may.”202  This raises the question: should resen-
tencing be done through the parole board or through a resentencing hearing?  
The next section will examine the pros and cons of both parole and resentenc-
ing hearings, followed by a suggestion as to what the Missouri legislature 
should do. 
1.  Resentencing Hearings 
The decisions in Montgomery and Miller held mandatory LWOP sen-
tences are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders convicted of first degree mur-
der.203  Therefore, “[w]hen a sentence of punishment is found to be void or 
 
 196. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731–32 (2016). 
 197. MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.047.1(1) (West 2017). 
 198. Id. § 558.047.1(2). 
 199. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 200. See generally Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718. 
 201. Id. at 736. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
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illegal, it will be committed back to the trial court for declaring a new sen-
tence.”204  Technically, this means that all juvenile offenders convicted of man-
datory LWOP sentences prior to Miller need to be resentenced.  However, there 
are drawbacks to the resentencing process, namely that it is time consuming 
and expensive.205  It is arguably a waste of judicial resources to re-litigate the 
sentencing phase for these individuals, who have already eaten up the time of 
over-taxed judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. 
Another problem with a resentencing hearing is that the decision of the 
new sentence is determined by one individual – the judge.206  With this decision 
being made by a single person, the likelihood for personal bias is greater.207  
Judges are not experts in adolescent development or the relationship between 
developmental science and juvenile crime and thus lack the competency to de-
termine if each particular juvenile offender is ready for release or should con-
tinue to serve a specific amount of time.208  This is not to argue that judges 
should never be able to sentence juveniles – it is only to point out that the con-
sequences of judicial inexperience are especially dangerous when it comes to 
LWOP juvenile sentencing.  Moreover, the availability of evidence and wit-
nesses available to testify will be greatly diminished in some cases, since some 
of these crimes happened decades ago.209 
However, there are also benefits when an individual receives a resentenc-
ing hearing – two important ones being the right to counsel and the right to 
appeal the decision reached at the resentencing hearing.210 
2.  Parole Hearings 
Likely due to the time and cost of the proceedings, the impact all these 
new cases would have on the already back-logged court system, and the con-
cern that the decision is made by one individual, the Court in Montgomery ex-
plicitly mentioned that states can use parole hearings, instead of resentencing 
 
 204. Resentence Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, http://definitions.usle-
gal.com/r/resentence/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 205. Claire Glass, How States Are Dealing with Unconstitutional Life Sentences for 
Juvenile Offenders, FORDHAM URB. L.J.: CITY SQUARE (Mar. 28, 2016), http://urban-
lawjournal.com/how-states-are-dealing-with-unconstitutional-life-sentences-for-juve-
nile-offenders/. 
 206. Rovner, Slow to Act, supra note 41. 
 207. See generally Jon’a Meyer & Paul Jesilow, Research on Bias in Judicial Sen-
tencing, 26 N.M. L. REV. 107 (1996). 
 208. See generally Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings from a 
National Survey, SENT’G PROJECT 29 (Mar. 2012), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf. 
 209. Glass, supra note 205. 
 210. See generally Stephen K. Harper, Resentencing Juveniles Convicted of Homi-
cide Post-Miller, NAT’L ASS’N DEF. LAWS., https://www.nacdl.org/Cham-
pion.aspx?id=32657 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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hearings, to determine the fate of the offenders mandatorily sentenced to 
LWOP.211 
The parole system provides some benefits not provided by a resentencing 
hearing.  First, the parole system is quicker than a court proceeding, and a 
board, not just one individual, makes the decision, so the likelihood of personal 
bias is minimized.212  Second, consideration is often given to a wider set of 
factors.213  For example, in Missouri, “[a]t [a] hearing the [Parole] Board will 
review the offender’s institutional conduct and adjustment, programs the of-
fender has completed, programs the offender needs to complete and any other 
issues the Board thinks is relevant.”214 
However, just as with the resentencing structure, there are drawbacks to 
the parole system.  State parole board authorities are appointed by the gover-
nor.215  Because these board members are appointed, they are typically “polit-
ically well-connected and come from law enforcement, rather than social sci-
ence or advocacy, backgrounds.”216  In Missouri, the seven-member parole 
board is composed of individuals of “recognized integrity and honor, known to 
possess education and ability in decision making through career experience and 
other qualifications for the successful performance of their official duties.”217  
There are no specific educational requirements for an individual to be a mem-
ber of the parole board in Missouri.218 
Another problem is that, while parole boards are required to consider a 
variety of factors – often set out in state statutes – there is nothing requiring 
them to give equal weight to all of those factors.219  For example, studies of 
parole decision-making have concluded that the “most influential factor in pa-
role release decisions” is the crime leading to commitment.220  The biggest fac-
tor considered is not the individual offender or any of his personal characteris-
tics but the severity of the initial crime committed.221  A Colorado study found 
that “[p]arole board members . . . determine if the inmate’s time served is com-
mensurate with what they perceive as adequate punishment,” basically mean-
ing that, at times, parole board members take matters into their own hands when 
 
 211. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 212. Victim Services Parole Hearings, MO. DEP’T CORRECTIONS, 
http://doc.mo.gov/OD/DD/OVS_Parole_Hearings.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
 213. Procedures Governing the Granting of Paroles and Conditional Releases, 
MO. DEP’T CORRECTIONS BOARD PROB. & PAROLE (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://doc.mo.gov/Documents/prob/Blue-Book.pdf. 
 214. Victim Services Parole Hearings, supra note 212. 
 215. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.665.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 216. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1072. 
 217. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.665.2. 
 218. Id. § 217.665.1. 
 219. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1040. 
 220. Id. at 1074 (quoting Joel M. Caplan, What Factors Affect Parole: A Review of 
Empirical Research, 71 FED. PROB. 16, 17 (2007)). 
 221. Id. at 1074–75. 
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deciding which factors to emphasize and which to ignore, with the goal of im-
posing the punishment they see as subjectively appropriate.222  Studies have 
also concluded that the behavior of offenders while in prison is “significantly 
associated with release decisions,” but these studies have revealed that prison 
misconduct – as opposed to good behavior – is the most influential factor in 
determining release.223  Effectively, parole is often denied when an inmate has 
a disciplinary violation, but good behavior in prison and involvement in pro-
graming does not equivalently increase a person’s chance of release.224 
In addition to the above-mentioned concerns, the judicial system neglects 
to provide any sort of meaningful review to inmates who have been denied 
parole.225  The leading Supreme Court case on this issue, Greenholtz v. Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, held that “there is no consti-
tutional right to parole release, [as] there is no liberty interest in the mere pos-
sibility of parole.  Instead, courts must examine the relevant statutory language 
to determine whether such an interest has been created and, if so, what due 
process protections attach to it.”226  Under that instruction, lower courts have 
consistently regarded parole decisions as an exercise of administrative discre-
tion, meaning it is reviewable under an “abuse of discretion” standard, if it is 
reviewable at all.227  This ultimately means that “the combination of highly 
subjective decisional standards and limited reviewability[, if any at all,] affords 
parole board members virtual carte blanche to deny release for almost any rea-
son, as long as they mouth the correct statutory language in doing so.”228 
The problems of the parole system generally are exacerbated when the 
inmate was under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the 
crime.229  Numerous factors that the parole decision-making process is centered 
around are increasingly problematic for such inmates when parole board mem-
bers fail to recognize and take into account the age and developmental status 
at the time of commitment.230  This is because, when juvenile offenders enter 
prison, they “bear[] the hallmarks of developmental immaturity.”231  Not only 
are they impulsive, prone to risk-taking, and more susceptible to peer pressure, 
they also are “extraordinarily vulnerable to abuse at the hands of guards and 
other inmates.”232  The combination of these factors often leads to frequent 
 
 222. Id. at 1075 (first alteration in original) (quoting Mary West-Smith et al., Denial 
of Parole: An Inmate Perspective, 64 FED. PROB. 3, 5 (2000)). 
 223. Id. (quoting Caplan, supra note 220, at 16). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 1076. 
 226. Id. at 1077; Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 
U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1979). 
 227. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1077 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4–123.53 (West 
2017)). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1078. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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emotional, and likely violent, outbursts.233  These violations give rise to pun-
ishments, which are later considered at parole hearings and comprise part of 
the evidence that parole boards can use to deny parole.234  Another factor is 
that since these inmates enter prison before even turning eighteen, they “have 
not yet established a foothold in the adult world,” and, therefore have fewer 
contacts and employment opportunities in the outside world.  For this reason, 
parole boards tend to view them as high risk, another factor used to support a 
denial of parole.235 
Ultimately, the parole system provides a solution to one of the obvious 
problems of the resentencing scheme but, as evidenced by the discussion in this 
section, presents its own problems. 
3.  Suggestion for Missouri: Parole and Resentencing Hearings Hybrid 
Model 
In order to comport with the holdings in Montgomery and Miller, Mis-
souri should create a new, separate parole board to decide the fate of its eighty-
four juvenile offenders sentenced to mandatory LWOP sentences.  This newly 
created parole board should follow a combination of the resentencing structure 
and the parole system, creating a hybrid system that draws on the positive as-
pects of each and eliminates, as much as possible, the drawbacks of each. 
This board will resemble a parole hearing to the extent that there is a board 
that the inmate will appear before.  All the benefits of the parole system that 
were discussed above – the quicker and cheaper process, the decision being 
made by more than one person, and the consideration given to a wider number 
of factors – will continue to be assets of the new parole board system.  How-
ever, the requirements to be a parole board member, the actions to be consid-
ered by the board, and the review of decisions made by the board will be fun-
damentally different than the current parole board system.  The hybrid model 
will combat the criticism that resentencing wastes time and judicial resources, 
as this new hybrid board will not draw resources from the traditional judicial 
system.  Furthermore, traditional parole criticisms, including (1) lack of proper 
decisional review process, (2) lack of representation for the inmate, and (3) the 
subjectivity and opportunity for manipulation by the parole board will be mit-
igated by this approach as well. 
The first aspect of the hybrid model is the educational and background 
requirements of the members of the parole board.  The members of the new 
parole board will be hearing cases that solely involve inmates who have been 
convicted as minors.  Therefore, these board members must have expertise in 
adolescent development, as well as an understanding of the relationship be-
tween developmental science and juvenile offending.  This requirement com-
ports with the findings in Roper, Graham, and Miller and supports the notion 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1078–79. 
 235. Id. at 1079. 
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that the impulsivity, different levels of risk aversion, and greater receptivity to 
peer influence of juveniles should lead them to be treated fundamentally dif-
ferent than adults in the judicial system. 
For instance, a parole board with this proper training will be better 
equipped to understand the effect that a juvenile’s vulnerability to guards and 
other inmates may have on his or her emotional “breaking point,” which would 
in turn explain why a juvenile offender may have numerous infractions before 
he or she becomes twenty-one, followed by fewer infractions after the age of 
twenty-one, as the offender becomes better able to control his or her emotions 
with age.236  The expert board members will account for the fact that, as men-
tioned above, inmates who were convicted prior to turning eighteen will have 
fewer contacts on the outside and fewer potential employment opportunities, 
which means that the board will not automatically deny parole based on those 
factors.237 
Parole board members with the proper developmental training will also 
understand that “crime is contextual,” and the “circumstances surrounding an 
offense, such as the participation of multiple perpetrators, stressors on the of-
fender, or the relationship of the victim to the offender, are highly relevant to 
the determination of just deserts and, possibly, one’s potential for rehabilita-
tion.”238 
In addition to the background requirements, the new parole board will 
have a set of guidelines they will follow when sentencing these juvenile of-
fenders; those guidelines will be similar to the guidelines a court would follow 
under the new resentencing structure discussed previously.  Basically, when 
sentencing a juvenile first degree murder offender, blameworthiness and of-
fender rehabilitation will be given more weight and consideration than the 
gravity of the offense, harm to the victim, deterrence, and incapacitation. 
This hybrid system also allows the inmates to have counsel for their pa-
role hearings if they so choose.  Consider the needs of the inmates in question 
here.  These individuals were sent to prison before they were eighteen, and they 
likely do not have the communication or education skills to represent them-
selves before the parole board alone.239  This means that these individuals are 
unable to effectively advocate for their release.  Indeed, the “[t]ranscripts from 
these hearings reveal . . . the utter disregard the Board often has for inmates 
who attempt to advocate for themselves and to articulate their sense of remorse 
and readiness for release.”240  Counsel is especially necessary in the context of 
the pre-Miller juvenile inmates, as they are being resentenced due to the fact 
that their constitutional rights have already been violated by the imposition of 
an LWOP sentence.241 
 
 236. Id. at 1078–79. 
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Another characteristic of the hybrid system tempers one of the biggest 
problems in the parole system: how malleable the outcome is in the hands of 
the parole board members.  This malleability is due to the fact that the board 
members are not required to give equal weight to all the factors they consider 
in determining parole eligibility, which results in parole board members having 
the ability to subjectively determine if they feel the inmate’s time is an adequate 
punishment.  And although discretion cannot be eliminated altogether, this sys-
tem will reduce the amount of discretion afforded to the parole board members. 
As discussed above, the crime committed is the single biggest deciding 
factor in granting parole.  Under this system, there would be a specific amount 
of weight given to each factor considered in determining the sentence these 
inmates sentenced to mandatory LWOP will have to serve.  What exactly those 
proportions would be is a discussion beyond the scope of this Note, but a de-
termination such as this needs to be made to ensure that these inmates are af-
forded a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”242 
However, the structure of how much weight each element should be given 
carries no meaning if the parole board members are not held accountable for 
their decisions.  Therefore, the hybrid structure will also allow inmates to ap-
peal their decisions to the court system under a deferential standard of review.  
The deferential standard of review gives deference to the parole board (which 
is comprised of experts in the field of adolescent development); yet it still pro-
vides inmates with the right to appeal the parole board’s decision, ensuring that 
the board’s decisions do not go unchecked.243  Currently in Missouri, the tran-
scripts from parole hearings are not available to the public.244  However, under 
this new model, the courts will need access to these transcripts when an of-
fender appeals a decision by the parole board.245  The option of appeal will 
incentivize parole board members to justly make sentencing determinations 
that give inmates who have already been denied their constitutional rights a 
meaningful opportunity for release.  Allowing these inmates to appeal the de-
cision of the parole board to the regular judicial system seems to be a fair com-
promise.  The alternative option is to address all eighty-four cases under the 
resentencing system, which would require all the inmates to go before the ju-
diciary to be resentenced.246  At least under the hybrid model, only the appeals 
of parole decisions would be heard by the court. 
Finally, the hybrid system will encompass a presumption of release after 
an inmate has served thirty years.  Pursuant to the discussion in Part III, under 
the suggested sentencing scheme, thirty years is the maximum sentence an in-
dividual can receive, and, therefore, any individual who has served thirty years  
 242. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
 243. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1088. 
 244. David A. Lieb, Missouri Parole Board Works Under Shroud of Secrecy, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.stltoday.com/news/state-and-re-
gional/missouri/missouri-parole-board-works-under-shroud-of-secrecy/arti-
cle_7c9beecf-3f36-574d-b436-430390ab9a38.html. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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will be presumed eligible for release.  However, a showing of either bad be-
havior while in prison or a likelihood that the offender is still a danger to the 
community can defeat that presumption.247  The presumption of release will 
also assist with efficiency concerns, as offenders who have already served 
thirty years will not have to go through a lengthy parole hearing if there is no 
evidence that runs contrary to the presumption of release. 
This new proposed system is not without flaws.  There will still be a strain 
on judicial resources when a sentence is appealed, and the creation of the parole 
board of adolescent development experts will undoubtedly require time and 
effort.  However, the various other aspects of the proposed system, namely the 
make-up of the new parole board, the opportunity to have counsel at parole 
hearings, the right to appeal, and the presumption of release after serving thirty 
years, address a number of major concerns surrounding these uniquely situated 
inmates. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The two trends of Supreme Court cases show the Court has consistently 
held that (1) children should be treated differently than adults in the criminal 
justice system, and (2) mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional.  These 
two trends of cases have led to the decisions in Miller and Montgomery, which 
have in turn led to the two issues discussed in this Note. 
In May of 2016, SB 590 was passed, enacting RSMO §§ 558.047, 
565.033, and 565.034 addressing both the Miller and the Montgomery deci-
sions.248  Currently in Missouri, a person who was under eighteen years of age 
at the time of the crime may be sentenced to either (1) LWOP, (2) life with the 
eligibility for parole, or (3) a term of imprisonment of at least thirty years but 
no more than forty years.249  Additionally, any person sentenced to LWOP for 
the crime of first degree murder committed as a juvenile prior to August 28, 
2016, is eligible for a parole hearing after serving twenty-five years.250  Alt-
hough these statutes bring Missouri into compliance with the Constitution, they 
are neither the most informed nor the best option available. 
Addressing these two issues is difficult.  It requires ensuring that juvenile 
offenders are punished accordingly so that the families of the victims, and the 
public in general, feel that justice has been served and that the offenders no 
longer pose a risk to society.  At the same time, it must take into consideration 
the fact that the juvenile offender was not fully developed physically, mentally, 
or emotionally and deserves a chance at rehabilitation. 
This Note suggests that Missouri reform its legislation to balance both of 
these concerns: (1) Missouri should abolish LWOP as a punishment for juve-
nile offenders and adopt an age-as-proxy sentencing scheme, as discussed in 
 
 247. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1087. 
 248. See supra Part IV. 
 249. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033.1 (West 2017). 
 250. Id. § 558.047.1. 
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Part III, for the sentencing of future juvenile offenders and (2) adopt the hybrid 
parole/resentencing scheme outlined in Part IV for the resentencing of the ju-
veniles who received mandatory LWOP sentences prior to the Miller decision.  
Both of these suggested solutions hold juveniles responsible for their actions, 
while still giving them the hope that one day they can live as free individuals.  
After all, “[a] young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave 
prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible individ-
ual.”251 
 
 251. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). 
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